Five years ago, European officials proposed the negotiation of a transatlantic free trade area (TAFTA) linking the United States and the European Union in the world's largest free trade zone. Flush from their successful conclusion of extensive multilateral trade reforms in the Uruguay Round, it seemed logical that the two leaders of the world trading system could work together to resolve their remaining trade problems and in the process set powerful precedents for the rest of the world to follow. In so doing, they would accelerate progress toward the ultimate goal of "global free trade".
pragmatic and narrowly focused work on regulatory barriers and other "nuts and bolts" trade problems.
Even without a TAFTA, US-EU trade relations have grown significantly: bilateral merchandise trade totaled about $400 billion in 2000 and cross-border direct investment in each other's market exceeds $1 trillion (on a historical cost basis). To be sure, major disputes continue to fester over bananas, beef hormones, aircraft and grain subsidies, genetically modified seeds and foods, and US subsidies provided under the Foreign Sales Corporation program. These problems demonstrate that TAFTA is more a vision than imminent reality for trade between Europe and North America.
Over the past few years, however, the European Union also has been quietly pursuing another TAFTA. New trade initiatives with its trading partners in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin presage the development of a free trade zone, or "TAFTASouth", over the next decade. A comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) is already in force with Mexico and negotiations initiated with the Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) and with Chile. In addition, the recently minted "Partnership Agreement" (discussed later) between the European Union and its developing-country partners in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific seeks to establish a more reciprocal relationship than existed under the previous Lomé accords that eventually transforms into a FTA. Unlike its previous free trade ventures in the postwar period, these European initiatives involve countries outside of the regional neighborhood and seek reciprocal rather than preferential trade deals.
To be sure, the European Union itself has not proposed a broad free trade pact with Latin America similar to the "Free Trade Area of the Americas" under negotiation between the United States and 33 other countries in the Western Hemisphere (see Schott and Hufbauer 1999) . Given the diversity in size and level of economic development of Europe's trading partners in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin, a TAFTA-South agreement would be a daunting task. In some respects, it is comparable to, though much less well defined than, the pursuit of an FTAA among Western Hemisphere countries.
Indeed, like the United States, the European Union has started the process by taking small steps with individual countries and regional groups; unlike the United States, it has not yet integrated those initiatives into a single negotiation that over time could create a super-regional free trade zone. This paper examines Europe's trade and investment ties with Latin America and the Caribbean and prospects for the evolution of a TAFTA-South accord. We first summarize the progress to date in the various bilateral and regional trade initiatives. We then analyze bilateral trade and investment flows to determine each side's interests and objectives in pursuing free trade talks. We conclude with comments on the implications of European-Latin American trade arrangements for US-EU relations and for the FTAA negotiations.
Europe's Building Blocks for a TAFTA-South?
Commercial relations between Europe and Latin America date back more than 500 years to a time when trade was unbalanced and unsavory, involving slaves, silver, and spices. The era of colonial exploitatio n is long past; today, European relations with the Americas are based on shared democratic values and economic partnership.
Responding to the dramatic economic and political reforms adopted throughout Latin America over the past decade, Europe has undertaken numerous bilateral trade initiatives to deepen traditional ties and to facilitate European participation in Latin America's economic revival. To a surprising extent, the EU initiatives mirror US commercial policy toward the region since the mid-1980s, albeit with a lag of several years. The US strategy proceeded in incremental stages. First, the United States granted unilateral trade preferences to the smaller countries in the region, under the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Andean Trade Preferences Act, and negotiated "framework" agreements to establish forums for bilateral consultations and future reciprocal trade talks. Second, the United States proposed integrating these bilateral and regional arrangements under the umbrella of a broader hemispheric trade pact (initially the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and then the FTAA).
The European Union has followed the first part of this script by providing trade preferences for developing countries under the Lomé conventions and negotiating framework agreements with either individual countries or regional groups. To date, however, it has not formulated a hemisphere-wide trade initiative like the FTAA. Rather its free trade strategy is more diversified and is proceeding at different speeds in various regions of the Americas. The European Union already has concluded an FTA with Mexico, but free trade talks with Mercosur and Chile are advancing at a snail's pace. With regard to services, the agreement specifies that within ten years the two parties will progressively liberalize bilateral trade in all service sectors with the exception of audio-visual, air transport and maritime services. In the interim, EU service providers will be accorded at least equivalent access to the Mexican market as that provided to those from other countries with which Mexico has preferential trade arrangements (including its NAFTA partners). Liberalization of investment is to start in three years whereas progressive liberalization of payments related to investments begins immediately. The accord also provides the European Union with access to Mexican procurement market that is practically equivalent to that of Mexico's NAFTA partners. • trade in goods, including inter alia rules of origin, customs procedures, import licenses, and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations;
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• trade in services, investment, and intellectual property rights; and
• competition policy issues (including antidumping), government procurement, and dispute settlement. table 6 ). During tha t period, the EU share of regional FDI inflows more than doubled to 44 percent in 1998. 9 In contrast, investments by US firms were fairly constant over this period, with annual FDI in the region averaging about $18 billion annually. As a result, the US share of FDI inflows into the TAFTA-South region fell from nearly 60 percent in 1994 to 21.5 percent in 1999.
Implications for US -EU Relations
Nearly two hundred years ago, European incursions in the US neighborhood inspired the "Monroe Doctrine", issued in 1823 to forestall potential colonial revivals in South America by European countries in the post-Napoleonic era. Today, the US response to the EU initiatives has not been as confrontational. To be sure, US exporters will continue to face increased competition in important growth markets in Latin America as a result of the new EU trade initiatives. Those trade pacts provide incentives for European firms to establish and win market share in the region. The immediate impact will not be substantial, however. Latin America and the Caribbean, excluding Mexico, accounts for only 10 percent of total US trade; including Mexico, the total rises to 20 percent.
More importantly, the EU initiatives should encourage the acceleration of domestic economic reforms and thus reinforce economic growth in the region. This result is good for the United States as well. Overall, the growth effects generated by the EU pacts should outweigh the adverse impact of the discriminatory trade preferences granted EU firms in the region. While this article cannot examine in detail the costs of trade diversion generated by the tariff preferences, two points bear mention:
• First, the margin of preference will be rapidly eroded as countries respond to globalization pressures and continue to reform their trade regimes unilaterally in order to source from the most efficient suppliers. In addition, some of the reforms undertaken pursuant to the trade pacts will be implemented on a nondiscriminatory basis for the simple reason that it makes no sense to have separate rules regulating investment, competition policy, and intellectual property rights.
• Second, trade diversion will be significant in a few industrial sectors but less so in agriculture due to exceptions to the trade rules or long transition periods to free trade. For example, the EU-Mexico pact already is prompting new EU investment in assembly plants and parts manufacturers in Mexico, and could lead firms to source their North American auto exports to Europe from Mexican rather than US or Canadian plants to take advantage of duty-free access to the EU market.
In short, US firms will have to compete more aggressively for market share--but in an expanding market. In addition, the EU pacts should contribute to the promotion of important US foreign policy objectives. Strengthening Latin American economic growth helps sustain the important political reforms achieved in the region over the past two decades. A stronger, more democratic region is a better neighbor and economic partner for the United States.
Finally, one should not forget that the EU initiatives are taking place at the same time, but over a longer period, as ongoing negotiations on a FTAA. As the EU pacts promote trade and investment in Latin America, those countries will have more flexibility in restructuring their economies to meet global competition. In turn, these reforms will make it easier for them to undertake and sustain free trade commitments with the United
States under the FTAA. And, to some extent, Latin American countries will use the TAFTA-South initiatives as a foil to the FTAA, using each to pressure the United States and European Union in turn to reduce their own trade barriers, especially in agriculture.
Both developed and developing countries can benefit from a dose of free trade medicine!
